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The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Art. I, section 15 of
the Califomia constitution both provide
that no party can be compelled to give testimony that would incriminate himself.
The policy behind the constitutional
provisions is to prevent "the employment of the legal process to extract from
the person's own lips an admlssion of his
guilt, which will thus take the place of
other evidence ... it exists mainly in order
to stimulate the prosecution to a full and
fair search for evidence procurable by
their own exertions and to deter them
from a lazy and pernicious reliance upon
the accused's testimony extracted by
force of law". Wigmore, Evidence, secl

b

to tum over certain books or records on

the basis that the information would tend
to incriminate him or her. Although the
contents of any documents which are
voluntarily made by the defendant may
not be privileged under the Fifth Amendment, Fisher v. United States (1976) 425
U.s. 391, the act of production may be
privileged and protected as incriminat-

tion 2263. p. 363.

ing. Fisher v. United States (1976) 425
U.S. 391. Counsel may assert a privilege

This privilege is deemed so fundamental to our adversary system that Art.

and refuse to turn over these documents
even when the content itself does not fall

I, Section 28(d) of the California Constitu-

within the privilege. The government
must then grant immunity as to the act of

tion, the "Truth in Evidence" provision
of Proposition 8, expressly leaves intact
the provisions in the evidence code that
provide for the existence of specified

turning over the documents in order to
compel their disclosure.

privileges.

B. CorporatIons

II. SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE

The privilege against self-incriminationactually includes two separate privileges which have been codified in the

California Evidence Code. The first is the
privilege ofthe defendant not to be called
as a witness in a criminal proceeding.

Evidence Code Section 930. The second is
the privilege of any person not to disclose
any matters which may tend to inaimi-

nate him/herself. Cal. Evidence Code
Section 940
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3

tion protects not only the compelled disclosure of oral testimony but also may
protect the compelled disclosure of certain types of documents and other personal property. Malloy v. Hogan (1964)
378 U.s. 1. Doe v. United States (1988) 487
U.S. 201, 209. An individual may refuse

The privilege against self-incrimina-

tion applies only to natural persons and
not to corporations, associations or even
to certain partnerships. The reason that

the privilege is limited in this way is an
acknowledgement that corporate organizations are set up under a state charter
and the state is entitled to examine their
records to determine if there is any

wrongdoing.
In Braswell v. United States (1988) 487
U.s. 99 a grand jury issued a subpoena to
Mr. Braswell as president of two corpo-
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rations ordering him to turn over certain
books and records. Braswell filed. a motion to quash asserting thatthe act of production has testimonial significance
which would incriminate him personally. The motion was denied and the
court held that since a corporation has no
Fifth Amendment privilege a corporate
officer could not "resist a subpoena on
the ground that his act of production will
be personally incriminating". 487 U.s. at
117. The court recognized that an extension of the privilege to the records custodians of corporate entities would "have a
detrimental impact on the government's
efforts to prosecute "white collar
crime' ... and authorities would be stymied not only in their enforcement efforts against those individuals but also in
their prosecutions of organizations. 487
U.S. at 115-116.
In Bellis v. United States (1974) 417
U.S. 85, 945. Ct. 2179,2186 the court held
that even a small law partnership could
not claim a privilege against self-incrimination. The test of whether an entity is
excluded from asserting a FFifth Amendment privilege is whether it "had an established institutional identity independent of its individual partners ... and
represent{s] a formal institutional arrangement organized for the continuing
conduct olthe firms [business]" 417 U.s.
at 95.
C. TestimonJal eYlclence

The privilege against self-incrimination protects any witness including the
defendant, from being compelled to produce "testimonial" or communicative
evidence. Schmerber v. California (1966)
384 U.s. 757. This includes the "accused
communications, whatever form they
might take, and the comp\llsion of responses which are also communications,
for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers". 384 U.S.
at 763. The fact that the defendant was
the source of the real or physical evidence is not, by itself, enough to make the
evidenoe testimonial. 384 U.s. at 764. The
matters sought to be protected. must be
truly "communicative" in nature.
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496
U.S. ~ 110S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d528,
the Su preme Court examined several
aspects of the procedures following an
arrest of a drunk driver to determine
which aspects of the tests and questions
elicited "testimonial" evidence which
was protected by the Fifth Amendment.
48
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The defendant, Muniz was arrested for
driving while under the influence on a
Pennsylvania highway. Without being
advised of his rights, he was taken to a
booking center where the sobriety tests
and booking procedures were videotaped. Muniz was not advised of his
Miranda rights until aiter the booking
procedure was finished. (This raised the
issue of whether the statements made by
Muniz were in violation of Miranda,
which will not be addressed here). The
court considered the relationship between the privilege and various types of
evidence obtained from the defendant.
[496 U.s. at 582]
First the court addressed the defendanrs statements in which his speech was
slurred and held that "any slurring of
speech and other evidence of lack of muscular coordination revealed by Muniz's
responses to Officer Hostereman's direct
questions constitute non-testimonial components of those responses. Requiring the
suspect to reveal the physical manner in
which he articulates words, like requiring
him to reveal the physical properties of the
sound produced by his voice, ... does not,
without more, compel him to provide a
'testimonial' response for purposes of the
privilege.
Second, the court addressed the content of the defendant's response to the
officer's request that he give the date of
his' sixth birthday. The court held that
this response was testimonial and incriminating not just because of the manner it which it was spoken but because
the content supported the inference that
the defendant's mental state was confused. The court stated:
"The vast majority of verbal statements will be testimonial, because there
are very few instances in which a verbal
statement, either oral or written, will not
convey information or assert facts'
Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to communicate an
express or implied belief, the suspects
confronts the "trilemma' of truth, falsity,
or silence ... " 110 L.Ed.2d at 549.
The court then addressed the admissibility of the seven questions asked before the "birthday" question including
name, address, height, weight, eyeeolor,
date of birth and current age. Although
the court held that this evidence need not
be excluded, they disagreed on the rational. Four justices found that the responses to these questions were not tes-

timonial in nature and therefore not
privileged. The other four justices found
the answers to these questions admissible under the "routine booking exception" to the Miranda rule.
Finally, the court examined the admissibility of video and audio tapes of
the defendant performing a series of sobriety tests. The court found that these
did not violate the privilege against selfincrimination. The court held that the
police officer's instructions did not call
for any verbal responses and therefore
the statements that were made were
purely voluntary.
In People v. Lopez (1963) 60 Cal. 2d
223,32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 384 P. 2d 16, the
defendant was arrested in connection
with a series of robberies. He was placed
in a police show-up and asked to put on
certain clothing and to speak. The court
held that there was no violation of the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination stating:
"There is no indication, on the record
before us, that the defendants made or
were asked to make any statements that
would tend to incriminate them. The
privilege [against self-incrimination] extends only to testimonial compulsion;
requiring defendants to assume a certain
pose for purposes of identification, or to
speak for voice identification is not
within the privilege ... Even within the
courtroom during trial a defendant may
be required to stand and remove a visor
so that witnesses attempting to identify
him (or presumptively exonerate him)
may have an unobstructed view of his
features." (citations omitted) 60 Cal. 2d
at 244.
In People v. Thomas (1986) 180 Cal.
App.3d 49, 225 Cal. Rptr. 277, the trial
court ordered the defendants to provide
pubic arid head hair samples, saliva, and
blood samples. The defendants claimed a
violation of their Fifth Amendment
privilege. The court of Appeals held "the
self-incrimination privilege inapplicable
to... non-testimonial evidence such as fingerprints, blood samples, breath tests,
appearances in line-ups, and handwriting and voice exemplars. 180 Cal. App.
3d at 52 (quoting People v. Collie, (1981)
30 Cal.3d 43, 55, fn.7, 177 Cal. Rptr.458.)
Evidence which has been deemed
non-testimonial and whose production
may be compelled without violating the
Fifth Amendment include: fingerprints,
[Peoplev. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614];
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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taking of photographs, [People v. Smith
(1956) 142 Cal. App.2d 287,293 P.2d 540];
taking of handwriting exemplars, [Gilbert v. California (1967) 388 U.S. 263,
267]; Voice identification, [People v.
Ellis (1966) 65 Cal. 2d 529, 534, 421 P.2d
393]; taking bodily fluids, [Schmerber v.
California (1966) 384 U.S. 757.
However, if the procedures are sufficiently invasive or brutal, counsel may
object that the taking of the evidence violates his client's right to due process even
where no privilege against self-incrimination may exist. [Rochin v. California
(1951) 342 U.S. 165, surgical procedures
violate due process; Winston v. Lee
(1985) 470 U.S. 753 held that involuntary
surgery to remove bullet violated due
process; People v. lanes (1989) 209 Cal.
App.3d 725, held a police choke as a
means of preventing the destruction of
evidence or to force the defendant to disgorge evidence violates due process]
California drunk driving laws have
an additional means of securing physical
evidence from a suspect who has been
arrested. Since 1966, California has had
an "Implied Consent Law" which provides that any person who drives a motor
vehicle in California is deemed to have
given his/her consent to chemical testing
of blood, alcohol, or urine for the purposes of determining the alcoholic or
drug content. The tests must be given
incident to a lawful arrest for Vehicle
Code Section 23152 or 23153. There are
several consequences for a refusal to take
the tests. The jury may be advised of the
fact that the defendant refused to submit
to these tests and instructed to consider
that refusal in their deliberations. However, separate from whatever may happen in the judicial proceedings, a person
who refuses to submit to one of these
tests may have his/her license suspended or revoked in a separate administrative proceeding.

m. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT NOT TO BE
CAu.ED AS A WITNESS
A. StatutOI')" Authority

Cal. Evidence Code Section 930
provides:
To the extent that such a privilege
exists under the Constitution of the
United States or the State of California, a defendant in a criminal case
has a privilege not to be called as a
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3
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witness and not to testify.
The privilege against seU-incrimination which is conferred on a defendant is
broader than that of any other witness.
"While a witness is privileged from answering any question which may be incriminating, the accused's right is greater
- an accused can refuse to be sworn and
need not wait to determine whether the
question calls for incriminating testimony. In re: Witherspoon (1984) 162 Cal.
App.3d 1001,1001,209 Cal. Rptr. 67, 68.
The defendant's privilege has two
basic requirements; 1) that the person
who holds the privilege is a "defendant"
and 2) that the privilege may only be
claimed in a criminal proceeding in
which that defendant is being charged.
B. Scope of the privllege

~

A person has the right not to be called
as a witness in any criminal proceeding
in which that person has the status of a
criminal defendant. Penal Code Section
16 defines criminal charges as felonies,
misdemeanors and infractions. Once the
criminal proceeding has commenced,
this privilege extends to all phases within
the case including the preliminary hearing, any and all motions to suppress evidence, the insanity portion of a bifurcated trial where the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity, the sentencing phase of a death
penalty case, and any probation revocation proceedings.
However, there are numerous proceedings which are part of the criminal
justice system to which the privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply. In these cases a person may be required to appear and to be sworn. Once
sworn, the individual is now a witness
and may refuse as a witness to answer
any questions which may tend to incriminate him/her.
In Re: Lemon (1936) 15 Cal. App.2d 82
the defendant, Lemon was subpoenaed
to testify before the grand jury which was
conducting an investigation into alleged
corruption in the San Francisco police
department. Lemon refused to be sworn
or to testify citing his privilege as a defendant not to testify. Lemon, was a police
captain in San Francisco and alleged that
"he was a 'potential defendant' as he was
one of a class of persons under investigation". 15 Cal. App. 2d at 83. The trial
court found Lemon in contempt and
committed him. This appeal was

brought as a writ of habeas corpus in
which Lemon seeks his release. The court
of appeal rejected Lemon's claim and
held:

[that] Lemon "has confused theposition of one having the status of a witness in any proceeding, civil or criminal, with the position of one having
the status of a party defendant in a
criminal proceeding brought against
such defendanLA grand jury investigation is in no proper sense a criminal proceeding and no person has the
status of a party defendant in such investigation which is held merely for
the purpose of determining whether
any criminal proceeding shall be
commenced". 15 Cal. app.2d at 8485.
The court concluded that
Every person may be compelled to
attend and be sworn before the
grand jury. It is [their] duty to answer all proper questions
address ... unless and until the answer to a particular question would
tend to incriminate him. Then, and
then only, does his constitutional
privilege intervene and furnish him
with a shield against self-disclosure.
15 Cal. App.2d at 91.
In Killpatrick v. Superior Court (1957)
153 Cal. App.2d 146,314 P.2d 164, the
court held that the defendant's privilege
not to testify applies during contempt
proceedings. Killpatrick was charged
with contempt for wilful failure to pay
support for his wife and children. At the
contempt hearing, Killpatrick had no
counsel and the prosecutor called him to
testify as a witness. During the hearing
both the prosecutor and the judge questioned Killpatrick about his actions. The
court of appeal granted the petition for
certiorari and held:

"Contempt of court is a public offense, and by section 166 ofthe Penal
Code is expressly declared to constitutea misdemeanor ... the procedure
for the investigation of the charge is
analogous to the criminal procedure
and the judgement against the person guilty of the offense is visited
with a fine, or imprisonment, or
both. 153 Cal. App.2d at 149.
49
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The court reasoned that even if the
contempt arises from a civil actioh, "the
proceeding to punish them for such misconduct is no part of the process in the

arguing the absence of other evidence to
rebut the governments case nor does it
preclude any comment by the prosecutor

civil action, but is in the nature of a criminal prosecution. Killpatrick at 149.
In Re Withspoon (]984) 162 Cal.
App.3d 1001, 209 Cal. Rptr. 67, the defen-

material witness. What is necessary,
however, is that the source of the missing evidence is someone or something

dant was charged with willful failure to

pay court ordered child support. The
trial court, over defense objection, allowed wife's counsel to call the defendant, have him sworn and to answer
questions on the "limited issue" of the
use of a community property asset. On
appeal, the habeas writ was granted for

other than the defendant.
In Griffin v. California (1965)380 U.s.
609 the defendant was convicted of first
degree murder in a California court. On
appeal the defendant alleged error upon
the fact that the prosecutor commented

to the jury in his closing argument that
the defendant failed to explain and deny
certain matters. The United States Supreme Court held that the comments on

on his right to have the state prove his
guilt. Therefore, the trial court must have
discretion to determine when the circumstances of the case are such that com-

ment is not permissible. 45 Cal.3d at 447.
In People v. Chandler (1971) 17
Cal.App.3d 801, 95 Cal.Rptr. 146 the de-

a defendants refusal to testify violated
the Fifth Amendment to the United
States constitution and "it cuts down on
the privilege by making its assertion

to produce an alibi if he were, in fact, not

nating questions. 162 Cal. App3d atl002.

costly". 380 U.S. at 614. The court held:

guilty of the crimes. The court held that

that the defendant should have been able

these comments were not improper in

In Black v. State Bar Association

(] 972) 7 Cal.3d 676 the court held that an

We:.. hold that the Fifth Amend-

that "Griffin" did not foreclose the pros-

attorney could not refuse to be sworn as
a witness but had only the more limited
privilege of refusing to answer any questions which would tend to incriminate
him/her. In this case, the court found
that any privilege was waived since no
objection was made at the time of the

ment, in its direct application to the
Federal government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on
the accused's silence or instructions
by the court that such silence is evi-

ecutor from emphasizing the absence of
other evidence to controvert the proof in
the People's case. Griffin does not bar a
suggestion by counsel "that a failure to
produce certain witnesses or evidence,

hearing.
In People v. Whelchel (]967) 255 Cal.
App. 2d 455, 63 Cal. Rptr. 258 the court
held that hearings under the Welfare and
Institutions Code Section 350 are civil in

dence of guilt. 380 U.S. at 615.

ing addicted. The court reasoned that the
confinement incident to the rehabilitation program, although involuntary, is

not a penal sanction. 255 Cal. App. 2d
460-461. Since these were not criminal
proceedings, the defendants could not
refuse to be sworn and testify, but could
only refuse to answer those questions
which would tend to incriminate them.

In People v. Ford (]988) 45 Cal. 3d 431,
247 Cal. Rptr. 121,754 P.2d 168 the defendant was on trial for burglary. Two of his

dant." 17 Cal.App.3d at 806.
Although the prosecutor may not

argued to the jury that if the defendanYs

jury to consider these failures by the de-

testimony was true, then the other persons should have been brought in to tes-

fendant.

tify. The defense argued that the co-de-

D. Waiver of the privilege

the third accomplice was awaiting trial.

The defendant testified and placed him-

fendants were not called to testify since

The defendant who takes the stand

they all had a valid privilege against self-

and testifies on direct examination
waives his/her privilege not to testify
and now subjects him/herself to the
myriad of consequences which follow.
The defendant is now subject to a full
cross examination by both the prosecution as well as by lawyers for any codefendant. The scope of permissible cross
examination may include any matters
which were raised either directly or by
implication on direct examination as
well as any and all permiSSible impeach-

incrimination and would refuse to tes-

tify. The court rejected this explanation

C. "Griffin" elTOr

does not foreclose the prosecutor from

mony, ... warrants an inference that the
witnesses or evidence were either nonexistent or unfavorable to the defen-

self with the alleged co-defendants at the
time of the burglaries at a different location. In closing argument the prosecutor

convicted pursuant to pleas of guilty and

holding that a witness must be called,
sworn, and refuse to answer questions
put to him before a valid privilege is

his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.
Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609.
That rule is also set forth in Cal. Evidence
Code Section 913. H.o wever, this rule

other than [the defendant's] own testi-

comment on the defendant's failure to
testify, once the defendant takes the
stand and testifies, the prosecution may
comment to the jury on his/her failure to
explain or deny any matters which are at
issue in the case and argue the implausibility of the testimony. The prosecutor
may also request the court to instruct the

alleged accomplices had already been

255 Cal. App. 2d at 461. at 263.

It is improper for any party to comment upon the defendant's exercise of

50

subject to criticism if applied when the
reason for his failure to do so is ambiguous or if the defendant is simply standing

alleged contemnor has an absolute right
to refuse to appear as a witness in the
proceedings" and is not limited only to
the privilege to refuse to answer incrimi-

nature and not criminal. These hearings
allow the court to commit to a rehabilitation program persons convicted of certain drug offenses and deemed to be addicted or in inuninent danger of becom-

7

on the defendanY s failure to call a logical,

447. However, the court noted that there
may be limitations on a when a prosecutor may argue these inferences stating:
[A] rule permitting comment on a
defendant's failure to call witnesses is

fendant offered no evidence to rebut the
facts presented by the government. In
closing, the prosecutor posed a series of
rhetorical questions which suggested

the defendant and the court held that"an

,.
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found. The court found the prosecutor's
argument proper and not a violation of
Griffin holding that "comment on a

defendant's failure to call a logical witness in no way undercuts the privilege
against self-incrimination". 45 Cal. 3d at

2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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ment. People v. Almanza (1981) 173 Cal.
Rptr. 822. This could include impeachment with the defendant's prior convictions (Evidence Code Section 788) or impeachment of his/her character (Evidence Code Section 1101). However, a
defendant may not be cross examined
about any earlier assertion of his/her
privilege not to testify either at an earller
proceeding or trial. People v. Sharer
(1964) 61 Cal. 2d 869, 40 Cal. Rptr. 851,
395 P.2d 899. (The court held it was error
for the prosecutor to cross examine the
defendant at trial about the fact that he
refused to testify at the grand jury based
upon his Fifth Amendment privilege).
In People v.l!J.<: (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603,
55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590, the defendant was a doctor who was charged with
raping a female patient. He allegedly
administered an anesthetic to her to prevent her from resisting. At trial, Dr. Ing
testified on his own behalf. The government proceeded on cross examination to
ask the doctor about several other offenses for which he was not yet charged,
in order to show a common scheme or
plan. The court held that this cross examination was proper, emphasizing that
"where a defendant takes the stand and
makes a general denial of the crime the
permissible scope of cross examination is
very wide". 65 Cal. 2d at 611.
In People v. lames (1976) 56
Cal.App.3d 876, 128 Cal. Rptr. 733 the
defendant was charged with burglary
and testified in his own behalf to an alibi.
On cross-examination the prosecutor
questioned the defendant about the fact
that he left the state for several months
after he had knowledge that he was a
suspect in the case and, in fact, was arrested in another state. The court observed that" A defendant in a criminal
case... may not be examined ... beyond the
scope of the direct examination... [as this]
would amount to forcing such defendant
to become the prosecution's witness. 56
Cal. App.3d at 887. However, the court
held that since the defendant's alibi constituted an lmplied denial of guilt and the
question of flight is relevant to the issue
of guilt, the cross examination was permissible.
In People v. Kaddison (1966) 243
CaI.App.2d 162, 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. 114, the
defendant was charged with possession
of marijuana. During his trial he took the
stand and testified that he was familiar
with marijuana from his studies at the
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3
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college. On cross examination the prosecutor asked the defendant: "You know
about marijuana because you have
smoked marijuana, isn't that true?". 243
Cal. App. 2d at 167. The defendant refused to answer the question and asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege.
The prosecutor moved to strike the
defendant's testimony and the court
granted this motion. On appeal, the defendant did not challenge the trial court's
striking of the defendant's testimony.
The only issue raised was whether the
question asked by the prosecutor was
properly within the scope of cross examination. The court of appeal ruled that the
question was proper as the prosecutor
was entitled to show that the defendant's
knowledge about marijuana was from
his prior usage and not his studies. The
court indicated that the test for the permissible scope of cross examination was
set out in Brown v. United States, 356 u.s.
148 and quoted from that opinion:
[W]hen a witness voluntarily testifies, the privilege against self-incrimination is amply respected
without need of accepting testimony freed from the antiseptic test
of the adversary process. The witness himself, certainly if he is a
party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry. Such a
witness has the choice, after weighing the advantage of the privilege
against self-incrimination against
the advantage of putting forward
his version of the facts and his reliability as a witness, not to testify at
all. He cannot reasonably claim that
the Fifth Amendment gives him not
only this choice, but, if he elects to
testify, an immunity from cross examination on the matters he himself
has put in dispute.

'"
The test for admissibility is: Does it
tend logically, naturally and by reasonable inference, to establish any fact material for the people, or to overcome any
material matter sought to be proved by
the defense? If it does, then it is admissible, whether it embraces the commission of another crime or does not,
whether the other crime be similar in
kind or not, whether it be part of a single
design or not. 243 Cal. App. 2d at 168.

In People v. Glidden (1989) 258 Cal.
Rptr. 463 the court addressed the issue of
whether once a defendant testifies, he/
she could be cross examined about his
post arrest silence. The court observed
that "[e]vidence of past-arrest silence is

so lacking in probative value and so
fraught with the risks of prejudice and
undue consumption of time it should
rarely, if ever, be permitted. However, in
this case trial counsel's failure to object
during trial defeated the issue on appeal.
In Peoplev. Sharer (1964) 61 Cal. 2d 869,
40 Cal. Rptr. 851 the prosecutor cross examined the defendant during the trial
with the defendant's refusal to testify
before the grand jury and the fact that the
defendant asserted his privilege against
self-incrimination as the basis for his refusal. The court held that this was reversible error The court rejected the governments argument that this evidence was
being offered solely as impeachment of
the defendant's trial testimony and held
that "it became impossible for the jury to
separate the 'impeaching nature of the
evidence from the inference that defendant refused to answer because he was
guilty". 61 Cal.2d at 877.
E. 11Ie "Single Proceeding" Rule

The privilege against self-incrimination is different than most other privileges in that any waiver is effective only
in the proceeding in which the defendant
testifies. People v. Lopez (1980) 110 Cal.
App.3d 1010, 168 Cal. Rptr. 378. This has
been termed the "Single Proceeding
Rule".
In most circumstances the testimony
of the defendant may be used at his/her
trial by the government as an admission
of the defendant. Therefore, if a defendant testifies at a preliminary hearing in
connection with his/her case, the defendant may not be called as a witness during his/her trial in that case. The prosecutors ability to use those statements as
admissions during trial depend on the
nature of the proceeding at which the
testimony was given.
In Simmons v. United States (1968)
390 U.S. 377 the defendant gave incriminating testimony at a fourth amendment
suppression motion. At trial, the government used his testimony on the issue of
guilt. The Supreme Court reversed and
held that the government was prohibited
from using this testimony or the defendant would be "obliged either to give up
51
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what he believed, with advice of counsel.
to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim
or ... waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination". 390 U.S.
at 394. The court found it "intolerable
that one constitutional right should have
to be surrendered in order to assert another" . 390 U.S. at 394.
In Peoplev. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d
867,120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024, the
court would not allow the testimony of
the defendant at a probation revocation
hearing to be used at his trial except for
impeachment or rebuttal. The court held
that to force an individual to choose between "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or injurious silence ... runs
counter to our historic aversion to cruelty
reflected in the privilege against self-incrimination. 13 Cal. 3d at 878. However,
the court held that this protection would
apply only at the final revocation hearing
and not to any testimony given at preliminary proceedings in that matter.

.
r
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individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is sho'WIl for
disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire
load; our respect for the inviolability
of the human personality and the
right of each individual 'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private
life' ... ; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization
that the privilege, wIDle sometimes
'a shelter to the guilty: is often 'a
protection to the innocent."

c. Scope of the PJ1vllage
Any person.. may assert a privilege
not to disclose incriminating evidence in
either a civil or a criminal proceeding.
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor, (1964) 378 U.S. 52, The
coultin People v. Lamey (1930) 103 Cal.
App.66, discussed the scope of this privilege stating:

Whenever the proffered evidence is
claimed to be privileged under Section
940, the person claiming the privilege has
the burden of showing that the preferred
evidence might tend to incriminate him;
and the preferred evidence is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to the court
that the preferred evidence cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the
person claiming the privilege.
The court, in deciding on the whether
the witness holds a valid privilege must
consider "matters disclosed in argument,
the implications of the question, the setting in wIDch it is asked, the applicable
statute of limitations and all other relevant factors. Law Revision Commission
-Comment to Evid. Code Section 404.
However, the burden is on the party asserting the privilege to present tIDS information to the court.
In Hoffman v. United States (1951)
341 U.S. 479 the Supreme Court discussed the application of the privilege
against self-incrimination as follows:

IV. WITNESS AND DEFENDANT'S
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SElJ'
INCRIMINATION

A .• Statutory Authority

Cal. Evidence Code Section 940 provides:
To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the
United States or the State of CaIilornia, a person has a privilege to
refuse to disclose any matter that
may tend to incriminate him.
B. Rationale

The rationale for the privilege against
self-incrimination was set out at length in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission
(1964) 378 U.S. 52, 55 where the Supreme
Court stated:
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations; our unwillingness to subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses.. our sense of
fair play wIDch dictates "a fair state52

To bring a person within the immunity of this provision [section 13 of
article I of the California constitution], it is not necessary that the examination of the witness should be
had in the course of a criminal prosecution against him, or that a criminal proceeding should be pending.
It is sufficient if there is a law creating the offense underwIDch thewitness may be prosecuted. If there is
such a law,and if the witness may be
indicted or otherwise prosecuted for
a public offense arising out of the
acts to which the examination relates, he cannot be compelled to answer in any collateral proceeding.
civil or criminaL unless the law has
absolutely secured him against any
use in a criminal prosecution of the
evidence he may give; and this can
only be done by a statutory provision that, if he submits to the examination and answers the questions,
he shall be exempt from criminal
prosecution for any offense that
may be disclosed as a consequence
of IDS examination. 103 Cal. App. at
69, quoting In re Tahbel, 46
CaI.App.755,758.

"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would , in
themselves, support a conviction
under a federal criminal statute but
likewise embraces those which
would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute the
claimant for a federal crime ... but
this protection must be confined to
instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger
from a direct answer...The witness is
not exonerated for answering
merely because he declares that in
so doing he would incriminate himself - his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.
It is for the court to say whether IDS
silence is justified ... and to require
him to answer if 'it clearly appears
to the court that he is mistaken' '" To
sustain the privilege, it need only be
evident from the implication of the
question in the setting in which it is
asked that a responsive answer to
the question or an explanation of
why it cannot be answered might be
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. [citationsomitted]
341 U.S. at 486-487. [emphasis
added]

D. Burden of Proof

Evidence Code Section 404 sets forth
the burden of proof as follows:

In People v. Whelchel (1967) 255 Cal.
App, 2d 455, 63 Cal. Rptr. 258 the defen2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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dant was called to testify at a hearing to
determine whether he should be committed for rehabilitation as an addict. The
court held that the person who is the suI>ject of these proceedings had no right to
refuse to testify [see section 41.21[2]
above] but could, once called, refuse to
answer questions which would be incriminating. The court discussed the
standard by which the self-incrimination
provision would apply:
To bring a person witltin the immunity of[Art.!, sec. 13 oftheCalifornia
Constitution}, it is not necessary that
the examination should be attempted in a criminal prosecution
against the witness, or that such a
prosecution should have been commenced and actually pending. It is
sufficient if there is a law under
which the witness may be indicted
or otherwise prosecuted for a public
offense arising out of the acts
which the examination relates, he
cannot be compelled to answer in
any collateral proceeding, unless the
law absolutely secures him against
any use in a criminal prosecution of
the evidence he may give. 255 Cal.
App. 2d at 462.

to

E. Documents

The general principle with respect to
the Fifth Amendments application to a
persons papers was set out by Justice
Holmes in Tohnson v. United States,
(1913) 228 U.S. 457, 458 where he stated:
A party is privileged from producing
the evidence but not from its production". Under this premise, documents,
records, or other writings which are lawfully seized from the defendant, or any
other witness, may be introduced at trial
against him without implicating any
Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fifth
Amendment "does not independently
proscribe the compelled production of
every sort of incriminating evidence but
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating. Fisher v.
United States (1976) 425 U.S. 391, 408.
"Where the preparation of business
records is voluntary, no compulsion is
present. United States v. Doe (1984) 465
U.S. 605, 610.
However, although the contents of a
document may not be privileged, the act
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3
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of producing the document maybe. "The
act of producing evidence in response to
a subpoena ... has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the
contents of the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control
by the [person]. It would also indicate the
[individual's] belief that the papers are
those described in the subpoena". Fisher
v. United States (1975) 425 U.S. at 410. In
a case where the government seeks production of documents or records from a
person (by way of subpoena or other legal process) the goverrunentmay need to
confer "production immunity" ,that is,
immunity that goes to the act of the production itself, in order to compel the production. This does not grant immunity as
to the contents of the documents, but
merely states that the act of production
may not be used against the witness in
any proceeding.
In Fisher v. United States (1976) 425
U.s. 391 the government sought from an
accountant the productionofa taxpayers
documents relating to the preparation of
their tax return. The court held that these
documents must be produced and involved no violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege of the taxpayers. The
court first cited that the compulsion here
was against the accountant and not
against the taxpayers and that "since it is
extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense of
justice ... [here]nothing is being extorted
from him. 425 u.s. at 398. Citing Couch v.
United States (1973) 409 U.s. 322, 328.
The court found no Fifth Amendment
privilege explaining:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment would
not be violated by the fact alone that
the papers on their face might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only against
being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial
communications ...The accountants
work papers are not the taxpayers.
They were not prepared by the taxpayers and they contain no testimonial declarations by him.
Furthermore, ... the preparation of all
the papers sought in this case was
wholly voluntary, and they cannot
be said to contain compelled testimonial evidence either of the taxpayers or of anyone else. 425 U.S. at

409-410.

In Andreson v. Ma'Yland (1976) 427
U.S. 463 the fraud unit of the State
Attorney's office seized a number of
documents from the defendants including a number of incriminating documents some of which contained statements of the defendant. The Supreme
Court held that no Fifth Amendment
privilege was offended by the introduction of these documents into evidence.
The court observed:
In this case, [the defendant] was not
asked to say or to do anything. The
records seized contained statements
that [the defendantl had voluntarily
committed to writing. The search for
and seizure of these records were
conducted by law enforcement personnel. Finally, when these records
were introduced at trial, they were
authenticated by a handwriting expert and not by [the defendant]. Any
compulsion of [defendant] to speak,
other than the inherent psychological pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence was not present.
427 U.S. at 473.
In United States v. Doe (1984)465 U.S.
605, the court discussed the Fifth
Amendment privilege that may arise in
the act of production of certain documents. In Doe, the District Court had
found that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial selfincrimination and had stated: "with few
exceptions enforcement of the subpoena's would compel [defendant] to
admit that the records exist, that they are
in his possession, and that they are authentic. These communications if made
under compulsion of a court decree,
would violate [defendant's] Fifth
Amendment rights. 465 U.S. at 613. 1n.11.
The Supreme Court observed that the
government could use the documents at
trial against the defendant upon a grant
of immunity as to the production of the
documents. The court observed, that this
grant of immunity "extends only to the
actofproduction... and need only protect
[defendant] from the self-incrimination
that might accompany the act of producing his business records". 465 U.S. at 617
1n.l7.
F. Testimony In prior proceedings
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pressured to testify in conformance with
her earlier statements to the police or her
preliminary hearing testimony. TheCalifornia Supreme Court disagreed and
held:
Nothing in Tillery's plea bargain resembles the evils inherent in the immunity agreements condemned in
those [other] cases. Nothing in the
record suggests Tillery was ever
told or led to believe that the benefits
of her plea bargain would remain in
force only if she testified in conformity with her statements to the police or her preliminary hearing testimony. 47 Cal. 3d at 239.
In People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.
App.3d908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501, the court
described the two distinct factual situations in which the statute applies:
The first arises when a witness, not
himself is within the target area of
the pending investigation or prosecution refuses to testify or produce
evidence on the ground of possible
incrimination....The grant of immunity to a reluctant witness located
outside of the target area of the inquiry follows a relatively straightforward course and may be effected
by a relatively simple procedure.
The statute also applies to the prospective witness who himself is situated
within the target area of the pending investigation or prosecution. Typically,
this witness is a party to a multiparty
crime, but his conduct is considered less
culpable than that of others involved,
and his testimony is believed necessary
for the successful prosecution of his fellow wrongdoers. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor may be willing to
promise immunity to the lesser offender
in order to secure testimony with which
to pursue the greater offenders ... " 32 Cal.
App. 3d at 912-913.
C. Enforcing the Immunity agreement

Since the immunity agreement is usually based upon certain agreements and
promises made by both sides, eruorcement of this agreement may become an
issue.
In People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.
App.3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 the people
appealed a court order dismissing the
56
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indictment and restraining further prosecution. The government claimed that
the defendant had failed to comply fully
with the immunity agreement and therefore they were free to prosecute her. The
court of appeals disagreed and upheld
the dismissal. The defendant in this case
testified at an accomplice's murder trial,
filed an affidavit recanting her testimony
and later recanting her affidavit. She then
testified at another accomplice's trial and
denied participation in the murder. In
this case the government impeached her
with her testimony from the first trial.
Immunity in this case was not granted
under PC 1324, but rather was the result
of an agreement between the prosecutor
and the defendant. However, the court
held that the agreement was properly
enforceable. The court observed that
"enough of the bargain was kept to make
it operative". 32 Cal. App.3d at 916. The
court observed two dangers involved in
negotiating and carrying out immunity
agreements with witnesses who are also
targets:
1) that the witness "does not testify in
the manner he said he would or refuses
to testify beyond a certain point, and
2) that a witness "may be so influenced by his hopes and fears that he will
promise to testify to anything desired by
the prosecution in order to obtain a grant
of immunity" .32 Cal. App. 3d. at 913914.
In light of these dangers the court
highlighted the desirability of court approval for immunity agreements and
suggested that the promises and terms of
immunity be spelled out clearly in the
record.
If the defendant in a case does receive
immunity under an agreement outside
of Penal Code section 1324 it is still enforceable against the government. However, if the immunity granted is "use"
immunity instead of "transactional" immunity, the goverrunent may still prosecute the defendant so long as the evidence used at the trial does not include
the defendant's earlier testimony nor any
fruits derived therefrom. In Kastigar v.
United States (1972) 406 U.S. 441, the
Supreme Court held that "the burden of
proof.. .is not limited to a negation of the
taint [of the earlier compelled testimony]; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the
evidence it proposes to use is derived
from a legitimate source wholly inde-

pendent of the compelled testimony".
406 U.S. at 460.
The defense has a right to reject any
informal grant of immunity by the government and may insist upon full statutory immunity before the court will compel his/her testimony. However, any infonnal immunity agreement may be enforceable once the court finds that the
parties have relied and acted upon it.
D.

"u.." Y. "Transactional" Immunity

While Federal law affords "use" immunity, California has adopted "transactional" immunity. Transactional immunity bars prosecution for the disclosed
substantive offense or the use of the testimony in a criminal prosecution against
the witness who was compelled to testify. The witness may be prosecuted for
perjury, false swearing or contempt for
failing to answer any questions or in failing to produce any documents in accordance with a court order to do so. Transactional immunity is broader than "use"
immunity.
Under a grant of "use" immunity the
prosecution is barred from using the
compelled testimony in subsequent
criminal proceedings or from using any
evidence derived from the compelled
testimony. The prosecution may still
charge the substantive offense about
which the witness testified, ifthey can do
so using evidence which was derived
independently of the compelled testimony.
In People v. Campbell (1982) 137 Cal.
App.3d 867, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340 a defendant was granted immunity to testify at
a trial. Later the defendant was convicted
of the same narcotic offenses, although
the government did not use his earlier
testimony. The court reversed holding
that the trial judge had no authority "to
judicially substitute the constitutionally
permissible 'use' immunity for section
1324's express grant of transactional immunity". 137 Cal.App.3d at 876.
The Federal Statute which grants immunity is 18 U.S.c. 2514 and provides a
grant of "use" immunity to an individual. However, the immunity which is
granted to a federal witness must protect
him against state self-incrimination as
well. Murphyv. Waterfront Commission
(1964) 378 U.S. 52. This may not preclude
all state prosecutions, however, so counsel should be cautioned to carefully examine the scope of immunity which the
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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individual has received. The law is well

settled that the grant of immunity is a
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In People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal.
App.3d. 806, 184 Cal. Rptr. 829 the defense made a motion at trial that the court

replacement for the constitutional privilege of self-incrimination, the immunity
must be as broad in scope as the privilege

grant a certain witness immunity so that

it replaces. People v. Lawrence (1972) 25
Cal. App.3d 498, 508, 102 Cal. Rptr. 16.
Therefore, the state may proceed in a
prosecution against the defendant if the

claimed that the court erred in not granting the witness judicial immunity. On

charges are outside the scope of his earlier testimony. In People v. Lawrence.

(1972) 25 Cal. App.3d 498,102 Cal. Rptr.
16, the court allowed a state prosecution

of a defendant on charges bf conspiracy
to commit murder of the pilot of the drug
smuggling ring where the defendant had

he could testify at trial. The court denied
the requ es t. On appeal, the defense

appeal, the court held that this issue had
been waived as the motion at trial related

specifically to immunity under PS 1324.
The court noted that the trial court did
not err in denying the motion under the
statute as PC 1324 gives the prosecutor
sole discretion to confer immunity. 134

Cal. App.3d at 812. However, the court

previously been a witness in a federal
trial against the head of the same drug
smuggling ring for incidents arising un-

dicially declared use immunity that "no

til March, 1968. The court held that the

United States Supreme Court decision

immunity did not extend to the conspiracy to commit murder charge which
occurred afte r the pilot "doublecrossed"the organization in June, 1968.'

Amendments to grant the trial court the
power to confer judicially declared use
immunity to a witness called by the de-

E. Defense Request of Immunity for a
Witness

The defendanr s fundamental right to
present witnesses can conflict with a witnesses right to invoke the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. A
witness asserting the privilege against
self-incrimination can withhold material, relevant and reliable exculpating
evidence from the trier of fact. Because
the defendant's right to present witnesses may be rendered meaningless
when a defense witness invokes this

privilege and refuses to testify, the defen-

went on to observe, in dicta that they
were persuaded against a doctrine of ju-

fense". 134 Cal. App.3d 815.
In People v. Williams (1970) II Cal.
App.3d 1156, 90 Cal. Rptr. 409 the court

clearly limited; ... the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory;
the testimony must be essential; and
there must be no strong government
interest which countervails against

sufficient to satisfy the court that the
testimony which will be forthcoming is both clearly exculpatory and

must make a convincing showing

ecutor has the right "to select the codefendant or coconspirator to whom im-

essential to the defendant's case.

munity shall be given. II Cal. App.3d
at 1164. The court observed that "when

fered testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory,
cumulative or it is found to relate

self-incriminating evidence is extracted
under the mandatory compu ls ions of
that code section such a person cannot
then be prosecuted for the offense concerning which he gave evidence against

sanctions.

ders of his father and step-mother. At
trial, he requested the trial court to grant
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The opportunities for judicial use of
this immunity power must be

a grant of immunity ...The defendant

defendant was charged with the mur-

who have a valid privilege against selfincrimination. There is no mention in the
statute for the defense to secure the same
procedures with witnesses whom they
wish to compel to testify. However, the
defense should raise these claims under
the constitutional right to due process
and a fair trial.

compulsory process and a fair trial. 49

Cal.3d at 974.
The only case to confer such a grant of
immunity at the request of the defendant
is Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith
(1980) (3d Cir.) 615 F.2d 964 in which the
court set Qut the standard by which it
was applied in stating:

plice to the crimes. On appeal, the court
held that there was no due process violation by the court's refusal to grant immunity. The court recognized that the pros-

to testify, under the threat of contempt

hel she wishes to compel testimony but

cases where a judicially conferred use
immunity might possibly be necessary to
vindicate a criminal defendanrs right to

refused to grant immunity to a defense
witness who was allegedly an accom-

himself. 11 Cal. App3d 1164.
In People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d
587,264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608 the

trict attorney to apply for a grant of immunity for those witnesses from whom

power, in such circumstances, to coruer
use immunity upon a witness called by
the defense" 49 Cal.3d at 973. It went on
to note that "it is possible to hypothesize

has construed the Fifth and Sixth

dant may request the prosecution and
the court to grant immunity from prosecution to the witness in exchange for the
witness' testimony. When a witness is
granted immunity in exchange for testimony, the witness can then be compelled

The language of Penal Code section
1324 specifically authorizes only the dis-

nity upon the written request of the prosecutor. 49 Cal. 3d at 973. While the court
observed that "the Court of Appeals of
[California] have uniformly rejected the
notion that a trial court has the inherent

judicial use immunity to his girlfriend so
that she could testify as to certain state-

ments of the defendant on the day of the
murder which would show his "state of

mind" on that day. The girlfriend had a
valid privilege as she was awaiting trial
on charges of an accessory after the fact
of the same murders. The trial court declined to grant the immunity and th e
California Supreme court affirmed. The

Immunity will be denied ifthe prof-

only to the credibility of the
government's witness. 615 F.2d at
972.
The court in Hunter found that the
defendant's offer of proof in that case fell

far short of the test set forth in Smith.
E. Procedure for Requeat and Grant of
Immunity

A request for immunity for a defense
witness can be made when, after having
been questioned in a criminal proceeding, a witness refuses to answer on the
ground that to do so would be poten-

tially incriminating. Upon the finding of
a valid privilege, the witness cannot be

compelled to testify unless immunity is
granted and the immunity is as broad as

court observed that the PC 1324 provides

the privilege itself.
At this point, the defense or the pros-

for the granting of transac~onal immu-

ecution may make a motion to the court
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to consider a hearing on the issue of
prosecutoriaJ inununity. Since the terms
of the statute require the request to be

made by the prosecution, the actually
request should be made by the prosecutor and in writing. In a felony case, if the
prosecu tion makes the motion, the court
must set a time for the hearing and order
the witnesses to show cause why the
question should not be answered. The
court must order the witness to answer
the question unless the court finds that
the witness could be subject to a criminal
prosecution in another jurisdiction or

that compelling the testlmony would be

•..

N

clearly contrary to the public interest .

Upon complying with the court's order,
the witness is immunized from prosecution based upon that testimony.
If the prosecution does not make the
motion, the defense can make a written
motion requesting the court to order a

hearing on the motion for immunity. At
the hearing the defense must obtain the
prosecution's approval of the immunity,
or the court's determination that due
process requires either immunity or a

dismissal ofthe charges. United States v.
Bautista (9th Cir. [Cal.j1975) 509 F. 2d
675,677.

DER

In a misdemeanor case, if the witness
makes an agreement in writing with the
prosecuting attorney to testify in return
for a grant of immunity, no hearing is
required. Upon written request of the
prosecuting attorney, the court must approve the agreement unless it finds that
to do so would be clearly contrary to the
public interest. If the immunity is obtained, a motion for a protective order
from the court is recommended, recording the agreeme nt, its terms,and the

scope of the immunity.
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Attention: All Public Defenders
From:CPDA
Subject: Updated Hot Lines

CPDA's Hotline numbers are listed
below for use by defenders needing
assistance in any of the areas listed.

Topics:
Computers:

Michael Cantrall
Frank Cox
Al Menaster

DUI:
916/ 362-5497
415/ 499-6321
213/974-3058

Contempt:

Albert Menaster

213/ 974-3058
805/568-3470
408/299-7700

CPDA Amicus:

Ethics:

Glen Mowrer
Stuart Rappaport

805/568-3470
408/ 299-7700

Albert Menaster

213 / 974-3058

Forensics/Questioned Documents:
Richard Fox
805/647-2021

Priors.
Parole Rev. and Post Conviction:
213/ 447-7464

Rowan Klein

Search & Seizure:

Albert Menaster

Juvenile Delinquency:

John H. Scott

Defender Case Counseling:
Stu Rappaport
408 / 299-7701

Juvenile Delinquency:
Lisa M. Greer
213 / 974-3056

Defender Case Counseling:
805/654-2200

Juvenile Dependency:
Gary Seiser
619/ 495-5546

Defender Case Counseling:
Glen Mowrer
805/ 568-3470

619/696-0282

Ken Clayman

Brad Bristow
Carmela Simoncini
Le~islation:

DiscoverylProp. 115 Issues:
Tom Havlena
714/834-2144
Grace Suarez
415/553-9305

Mi e Arleelian

DNA:

Priors:

Walter F. Krstulja
Jeffrey E. Thoma

213/ 974-2811
619/ 338-4880

916/441-3792

916/ 440-6970

Pretrial Motions:

Grace Suarez
Michael Ogul

415/553-9305

510 / 268-7411

Sentencing:

Jury Instructions: Trials &Al:peals
Tom Lundy
707 545-3312

415/543-3379

510/ 268-7411

Sentencing:

Charles Denton

415/ 646-2481
213/ 243-0346
415/495-0500
213/974-3050

Sue Burrell

213/974-3058

Search & Seizure:

Charles Denton

Hank Hall

Jack Funk
Gary Mandinach
Linda Robertson
John H. Scott
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707/ 459-3999
310/ 458-5361

Evidence:

ConflictslEthics:

Glen Mowrer
Stuart Rappaport

Ed Kuwatch
Bill Thornbury

We would like to draw your
attention to a couple of new subject areas: Jury Instructions and

213/ 974-3066

Speedy Trial:
213/ 974-3050

"Three Strikes, You're Out":
Al Menaster
213/ 974-3058
Grace Suarez
415 / 553-9305
Michael Ogul
510/ 272-6600
Alex Ricciardulli 213/ 974-3067
Jack A. Hochman 619/338-4670

Training:

Mark Arnold

916/ 666-8165

Voir Dire:

Michael McMahon 805/568-3489
Writs:

510/ 272-6600

Al Menaster
John H . Scott

213/ 974-3058
213 / 974-3050
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